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The Origins of Exercise ALCORA, 1960–71
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses* and Robert McNamara
Over the course of the 1960s, Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, hard-pressed
by African nationalist movements and international opinion, grew closer
together, realising that their common enemies could only be defeated by a
common stance. The most important attempt to meet the threat to white
political domination in Southern Africa was Exercise ALCORA, a military under-
standing negotiated, in secret, in October 1970. From then until the Portuguese
Revolution in 1974, regular meetings of the representatives of the three countries’
armed forces pooled intelligence and defined new strategies for the on-going con-
flicts in Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique, and put in train plans for future,
larger-scale clashes. This article examines the origins of ALCORA, charting the
process by which Lisbon, Salisbury, and Pretoria came together despite consider-
able obstacles. It highlights the importance of domestic factors, notably in South
Africa, ALCORA’s senior partner. There, the murder in 1966 of Prime Minister
Hendrik Verwoerd led to a circumstance wherein leading figures of the regime
enjoyed much greater freedom in the definition of policy than before. One benefi-
ciary was Defence Minister P. W. Botha who, with the army’s backing, would
develop a total strategy against what was perceived as a total threat. Exercise
ALCORA was a key component of this strategy.
Keywords: Southern Africa; decolonisation; ALCORA; counter-insurgency
Introduction
On 29 November 1972, the South African Vice Consul and Military Attache in
Luanda, William S. ‘Kaas’ Van Der Waals, a paratrooper and senior South African
Defence Forces (SADF) intelligence analyst, received a top-secret message from the
SADF Chief of Staff directing him to act as liaison with the Portuguese military in
connection with a top-secret exercise, codenamed ALCORA. ALCORA had been
established to ‘investigate ways and means of achieving a co-ordinated tripartite
effort among Portugal, Rhodesia, and the RSA (Republic of South Africa) with a
view to countering the mutual threat against their territories in Southern Africa’.1
According to the document, ALCORA was structured as follows: at the summit
stood the ALCORA Top-Level Committee (ATLC); below this was the ALCORA
Coordinating Committee (ACOC), with a series of subcommittees dealing with key
priority areas of concern. These included information, forward planning, logistics,
transportation, and telecommunications. According to the message, ALCORA had
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commenced with top-level liaison between the South African and Portuguese armies
in October 1970, with Rhodesia being invited to join in March 1971.2
In September 1973, formal links between the three powers would be strengthened
further when their respective Ministers of Defence agreed to the establishment of the
Permanent ALCORA Planning Organisation (PAPO), a replacement for ACOC and
the various subcommittees. PAPO was due to commence its operations in January
1974, and was indeed at an early stage of development when the Portuguese Revolu-
tion took place in April 1974.3 Despite the revolution, Exercise ALCORA would
continue, though with diminishing effectiveness, until October 1974, when the final
meeting of the ATLC in Lisbon formally ended Portuguese participation. Having
finally accepted decolonisation as the inevitable outcome of the democratisation pro-
cess taking place in Portugal and having agreed a date for Mozambican indepen-
dence with the leadership of the Frente de Libertac¸~ao de Moc¸ambique (FRELIMO),
the Portuguese now sought to disassociate themselves from a politically embarrass-
ing association with the unrepentant regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria.4 Some
elements of the ALCORA structure may have survived for a time in Rhodesian–
South African co-operation until at least 1975, namely the production of intelligence
reports on threats to Southern Africa.5
Was ALCORA a formal defence pact, the military manifestation of the ‘unholy
alliance’, as opponents called the suspected political, economic, and military linkages
between South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia?6 This article suggests that even if no
formal mutual-assistance treaty actually existed, the nature of the co-operation con-
stituted a commitment to joint defence should a major external threat emerge. This
much is clear from recent releases in the Portuguese, South African, and Ian Smith
archives.7 An analogy can be drawn between ALCORA and other informal military
understandings - most notably the French–British staff talks prior to the First World
War, which greatly contributed to Britain’s decision to enter that conflict.8 The anal-
ogy is especially apt given that there is much dispute as to how much most of the
British Cabinet knew in 1914 about the moral commitment to the defence of France
that Britain had made through its participation in staff talks.9 Similarly, ALCORA
appears not to have had any formal imprimatur from the cabinets of South Africa,
Portugal, or Rhodesia. This article suggests that ALCORA was in part the offspring
of the on-going power struggles within the Republic of South Africa, the ‘senior
partner’, due to its wealth and military potential, of the three ALCORA countries.
The SADF and the Minister of Defence from 1966–80, P. W. Botha10, had key roles
in the creation of ALCORA. Indeed, the origins of the ALCORA project throw up
some interesting questions about who actually ran South African foreign policy in
the 1960s and early 1970s, after the accession of John Vorster in 1966.11 While con-
flicts between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Information were
widely commented upon in the South African press from the mid 1970s, there was
also a bitter struggle between the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and military
intelligence ‘over the entire thrust of security politics’.12
The ‘unholy alliance’
A rapidly changing world brought about close co-operation between South Africa,
Portugal, and Rhodesia in the 1960s. Enthusiasm for empire dried up among most
colonial powers in the wake of the Second World War, while a significant interna-
tional anti-colonial alliance developed, bringing together newly independent Asian
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and African states, Communist-bloc countries, and a growing number of western
European states. John F. Kennedy added the United States to this alliance, making
it seemingly irresistible. As African nationalism swept across the continent, and
European administrations headed home, the remaining white governments in Africa
found themselves increasingly vulnerable and casting around for support, despite the
differences that separated them. While South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were
parliamentary democracies (albeit with obvious franchise restrictions, depending,
respectively, on race and degree of ‘development’), Portugal had been, since 1926, a
dictatorship, being led from 1932 onwards by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.
In the context of the cold war, the white regimes of Southern Africa all used simi-
lar discourses about the threat posed by the Communist bloc. Indeed, they saw them-
selves as exemplary defenders of white Christian civilisation besieged by African
nationalists directly controlled from Moscow or Beijing.13 Portugal, under Salazar,
had been vehemently anti-Communist since the 1930s, a circumstance which facili-
tated its integration into NATO in 1949. South Africa increasingly used anti-
Communism after 1961 as the means to secure white unity between Afrikaners and
English South Africans.14 Indeed, the Nationalist Party had fused the themes of
the Communist menace and a black uprising as far back as the 1930s.15 And many
Rhodesians saw themselves as upholding the spirit of Great Britain against the
Communist menace - a stance which, according to them, had disappeared from the
Harold-Wilson-led Britain of the 1960s.16 The reluctance of the West, particularly
Great Britain and the United States, to supply them with the necessary weaponry to
defend themselves was presented by the three countries as prime evidence of the deca-
dence of that same West. For the Portuguese, NATO restrictions on using alliance-
supplied weaponry in their counter-insurgency campaigns in Africa were especially
galling. Afrikaaners discerned a continuous line of British perfidy running from the
Boer War, through Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech, to the reneging on the sup-
ply of arms supposedly guaranteed by the Simonstown naval agreement of 1955.
Not all the fears of the whites regarding Soviet and Chinese intentions were
completely far-fetched. The Southern African liberation movements came increas-
ingly to rely on support and arms from the Eastern Bloc as the 1960s wore on. The
building of the Tanzania–Zambia (TANZAM) railway link by thousands of Chinese
labourers was designed to reduce Zambia’s dependence on white-owned transport
links, and represented a massive financial commitment by Beijing - one that set alarm
bells ringing among the political and security elites of the self-styled ‘white
redoubt’.17 The Cuban intervention in Angola after 1975 would further demonstrate
the fears of Communist intervention were not entirely false.
However, there were differences on the issue of race. South African apartheid,
underpinned by fantastical pseudo-sociological concepts, was in essence a ruthless
programme of separate development, little more than a licence to ethnically cleanse
huge numbers of Africans from white areas to economically barren homelands. On
the surface at least, apartheid was different from Portugal’s intention to create a
multi-racial society and from the partnership model of Rhodesia and its predecessor,
the Central African Federation, which had promised political and economic opportu-
nity for all based on a qualitative franchise. However, in practice, particularly in the
later 1960s, racial policies began to converge. Portugal’s undemocratic political
system, as well as the massive influx of Portuguese migrants to Angola and the deteri-
oration in security after 1961, all contributed to growing racial distrust, while the
Rhodesian Front’s rise to power and desire for independence was motivated by a
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desire to change the 1961 multi-racial Southern Rhodesian constitution, which sought
to remove barriers to black advancement, and instead push the possibility of majority
rule far into the future.18 The constitution of the Republic of Rhodesia (1969) aimed
at both that outcome and a new racial dispensation inspired by apartheid.
Co-operation among the three countries was impossible to keep secret.19 Some
aspects - most notably South African and Portuguese sanctions-busting to keep Rho-
desia afloat economically after its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in
November 1965 - are well known.20 Other aspects of this tripartite co-operation are
perhaps less familiar. Elements of the paramilitary South African Police (SAP) were
deployed in Rhodesia in 1967 after a joint incursion there by South African, African
National Congress (SAANC), and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) guer-
rillas.21 This police detachment, which may have, at its peak, numbered some 2,000
men, remained in place until 1975, when John Vorster withdrew it, hoping to put
pressure on Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to reach a compromise with
African nationalists. This was a great betrayal in Smith’s eyes.22 The deployment of
the SAP, rather than the SADF, led to resentment among senior military officers.
They saw it as a usurpation of their role by the increasingly influential head of
Republican Intelligence, General Hendrik van den Bergh. Later, in 1969, with the
creation of the BOSS, van den Bergh established his own personal control over all
intelligence gathering, greatly diminishing the role of the SADF’s Military Intelli-
gence Department (MID), again to the great annoyance of the military.23
Indeed, considerable police and intelligence co-operation and liaison existed
between Rhodesia, South African, and Portuguese police and intelligence services.
As far back as July 1958, Mozambique-based Portuguese and Rhodesian police
agents met in Salisbury to discuss security co-operation.24 The rhythm of these meet-
ings increased throughout the 1960s as the perception of a common threat grew.
From these meetings it became evident that the police forces and intelligence services
(in the Portuguese case the two functions were carried out by the same entity, the
Polıcia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, PIDE) were becoming more ambitious in
their goals, hoping to have a say in the elaboration and execution of foreign policy.
ALCORA, however, is the least known plank of this co-operation.25 Memoirs of
some of the protagonists shed only little light on the subject. Ian Smith’s memoirs
are notably silent on the matter as are even well informed contemporary accounts.26
Hilton Hamann, who held lengthy interviews with many apartheid-era South African
Generals, does not mention ALCORA, and describes South African military support
to Portugal as ‘small scale’ with a limited supply of arms and the occasional ferrying
of Portuguese troops on counter-insurgency operations by South African helicop-
ters.27 Ken Flower, Director of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation
(CIO) from 1964 to 1981, while giving considerable coverage of the intelligence co-
operation between the three white regimes in his memoirs, makes only one reference
to military discussions. He recalls that these called for ‘a common strategy of “Joint
Defence of the Zambezi River Line”, but there seemed little prospect of translating
theory into practice’.28 And General Kaulza de Arriaga, a hardliner who served as
Commander-in-Chief in Mozambique, referred explicitly in his Guerra e Polıtica: Em
Nome da Verdade to an ‘Alcora Alliance’ which never lived up to its promise.29
Extant references to ALCORA are, for the most part, incomplete or incor-
rect.30 More recently, Paulo Correia and Grietjie Verhoef have made a useful
contribution to the literature on some of the co-operation between South Africa
and Portugal in the 1960s, though there are lacunae, notably a lack of access to
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some key South African defence archives and the Rhodesian perspective in their
account of South African–Portuguese defence relations.31 Most pertinently,
extracts from some of the Portuguese minutes of the ALCORA Top-Level
Committee meeting have been printed, without any indication of sources, in a
recent chronology of Portugal’s colonial wars.32
The crisis of the early 1960s
The distant origins of the Exercise ALCORA lie in the tumultuous events of 1959–62,
when the edifice of white-minority rule in southern Africa came under severe pressure
from an increasingly confident African nationalism. Successive blows struck the white
regimes: the 1959 state of emergency in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
exposed the hollowness of the multiracial ‘partnership’ model there; the violent after-
math of the decolonisation of the Belgian Congo (1960) demonstrated the vulnerabil-
ity of white expatriates in the newly independent states; and Harold Macmillan’s
‘wind of change’ speech in January 1960 suggested that Britain could no longer
be relied upon to defend southern Africa’s whites. Subsequently, the report of the
Monckton Commission severely undermined the Federation, while the Sharpeville
massacre of March 1960 and the bloody 1961 insurrection in northern Angola
appeared to presage a future of endless racial disharmony and conflict. The Federa-
tion itself was dissolved at the end of 1963, with Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and
Malawi (Nyasaland) becoming independent the following year. Southern Rhodesia
was left with a white-minority government, autonomous in most of its affairs, but still
not independent from Britain.33 This was accompanied by a significant drift to the
Right among the white electorate. The Rhodesian Front Party, an embodiment of
this sentiment, was determined to secure independence with white rule left intact, or
even extended. The failure of Winston Field, the Southern Rhodesian PrimeMinister,
to secure this solution led to his political demise in April 1964 and replacement by Ian
Smith, an advocate of unilaterally declaring independence.
The white states proved both more resilient and intransigent than their
opponents - and perhaps even they - predicted. White military and security resources
remained far superior to those of their black opponents. Portugal’s determination to
fight for Angola, and its ability to contain the nationalist revolt, provided an impor-
tant example. This determination was actually strengthened by the country’s central
weakness: its underdeveloped economy. Portugal, unlike Britain, France, or even
Belgium, had little prospect of creating a neo-colonialist relationship should it
choose to decolonise, as Salazar told US diplomat, George Ball, in August 1963.34
Salazar’s government opened up the colonial economies to foreign investment, which
flowed quickly into resource-rich Angola and Mozambique, and this, combined with
new economic opportunities, derived from the presence of a large military contin-
gent, led to substantial emigration from the metropole to the colonies. The white
population of Angola increased from 200,000 in 1960 to a 1968 estimate of 400,000,
approximately 7.5% of the entire Angolan population.35 It would continue to
increase until 1974. Meanwhile Southern Rhodesia, with strong Portuguese backing,
unilaterally declared independence from Britain on 11 November 1965. In both
Angola and Rhodesia (but not so Mozambique, where FRELIMO would emerge as
the sole credible challenger to Portuguese rule), the liberation movements were frac-
tured on tribal lines, which limited their threat, though they all remained in being.
South Africa, aided by its cordon sanitare of white-ruled countries to the north,
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ruthlessly crushed black unrest and urban-guerrilla movement; by 1965, the leader-
ship of the SAANC and the PAC was dead, jailed or in exile.36
Initial moves and hesitations
Sir Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister from 1956 to 1963, was a strong propo-
nent of a mutual defence pact for Southern Africa but was stymied by Portuguese
and South African indifference and British government hostility.37 In the face of the
growing threat to southern Africa posed by African nationalism after 1960, South
African and Portuguese attitudes began to change. H. T. Taswell, the South African
High Commissioner to the Federation, wrote in February 1961: ‘One cannot but
detect in United Kingdom policy a feeling of apathy towards the white man in Africa
and a strong desire to rid Britain of its overseas colonial responsibilities as quickly
as possible.’38 Arguing that a ‘buffer state to the North has many advantages for
us - both political and economic’, he requested a ‘rough indication’ of official South
African feelings on the matter as ‘it could very well come up as a practical and impor-
tant political issue in the not too distant future.’39 In October 1961, as tensions
between the British Government and the Federation increased, there were indica-
tions from Roy Welensky that he might be willing to declare independence. Taswell,
assured by the Federal Defence Minister, John Moore Caldicott, that the United
Kingdom would use force to resolve the situation, suggested that military contacts
with the Federation should be intensified, arms should be supplied and there should
be an exchange of military intelligence on other territories. He commented: ‘The lon-
ger the Federation can remain an effective buffer for us the better.’ Taswell also met
the Portuguese Consul-General at Salisbury, Jo~ao Pereira Bastos, to discuss matters
such as the possible use of Mozambique as a base for infiltration (and later attack)
against South Africa, the disintegration of the Federation, and Washington’s posi-
tion on Africa, which, according to Pereira Bastos’ report on the meetings, Pretoria
had begun to fear more than the Russian threat.40
South Africa carried out an examination in 1962 of what military support it could
give the whites in the Federation in the event of outbreaks of domestic unrest, foreign
intervention from the north in support of domestic rebellion, or action by the United
Nations at their own initiative or that of the United Kingdom, possibly by a Labour
government. The means by which South Africa could help included delivery of weap-
ons and equipment; assistance with domestic security and order to free up
Rhodesian military forces; admission of South African volunteers to join the Federal
forces; and direct military assistance by SADF. The problem, as the authors of the
study saw it, was that such aid could itself provoke African, UN, or British interven-
tion, and direct military aid would almost certainly lead to foreign or UN interven-
tion unless it could be delivered on such a scale and at such speed that it was
immediately successful.41
On 1 March 1963, the South African Ambassador to the United States, W.C.
Maude, spoke to the Federation’s representative - attached to the British Embassy in
Washington - Air Vice Marshall O.B. Bennett. Bennett, according to the
Ambassador’s account, intimated that he desired closer co-operation between the
Federation (or perhaps just Southern Rhodesia), the Republic, and Angola and
Mozambique as well as the abandonment of the policy of emphasising differences
with South Africa and Portugal. He argued: ‘The time has come [. . .] to reconsider
these matters with a view to establishing the “solid block of us three”.’ Noting the
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‘remarkable manner’ in which formerly pariah powers such as Franco’s Spain, ‘with
the passage of time’, had been rehabilitated, Bennett concluded that Washington
might rethink its policies when faced with a unified white Southern Africa. Maude
assumed that these matters (an alliance) were being studied at home.42 A month
later, Taswell reported on conversations with Roy Welenksy and the Southern
Rhodesian Prime Minister, Winston Field. He noted that there was an impending
constitutional struggle ‘which could conceivably have serious and far-reaching
repercussions’. He warned: ‘If Southern Rhodesia falls, our bastion to the North
goes and the attack on us can start. As Sir Roy put it when I saw him on April 4, the
breakup of the Federation is part of the march to Pretoria. This is the start of the sec-
ond Boer War.’43 However, in May 1963, Verwoerd made clear to Welensky that he
‘would not entertain a political link with Southern Rhodesia’ but would provide eco-
nomic aid.44 Furthermore, when Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Treasury Minister,
attempted to ascertain South African views on a unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence in November 1963, just one month before the Federation’s dissolution, he was
told that there was no prospect of South African support should Britain intervene
militarily.45
South Africa, while hardly indifferent to the fate of its white neighbours to the
north, appears to have been unsure what could be done to help. There was a
considerable degree of ambivalence about the racial policies of the Portuguese and
Rhodesian governments in South African circles. South African politicians, in pub-
lic, and diplomats, in private, were not above sneering at the attempts of both to con-
trive, through publicity and lip-service legislation, that they were better than South
Africa. Some white South Africans were openly contemptuous of the Portuguese.46
Verwoerd, a survey of the documentary evidence would suggest was, at heart, an iso-
lationist. As the Portuguese themselves noted, the South Africans (or the Afrikaners
at least) considered that they had much deeper roots in Africa - and nowhere else to
retreat to.47 In June 1961 the South African Defence Minister, Jacobus Johannes
Fouche, announced that in a forthcoming visit to Europe in July he would like to
stop off in Portugal, ‘to exchange information of common concern to our countries’.
He did so, accompanied by Secretary General of the Defence Ministry, and General
Pieter Grobbelaar, Commandant-General of the SADF. While the Pretoria News
seemed to hope for the establishment of a defensive pact against ‘black aggression’
from the north, the Star, in an editorial on 6 July, warned: ‘We hope he is not con-
templating anything in the nature of a military alliance with the Portuguese.’
Ken Flower noted that the Rhodesian Front government was unable to compre-
hend that South African and Portuguese interests did not necessarily always coincide
with Rhodesia’s. South African intelligence personnel made clear that they were
sceptical about UDI. On the other hand, the Portuguese explicitly stated that they
would support the Rhodesians, though Flower doubted the value of such help.48
Portuguese–Southern Rhodesian military and intelligence contacts intensified
between 1961 and 1965 and an arms deal, strongly supported by Portuguese diplo-
mats, was signed prior to UDI. By then, Salazar had met Ian Smith in Lisbon. Smith
later recounted that he was most taken with the Portuguese dictator 49, and wrote
him afterwards: ‘I was particularly impressed with the frankness of our exchanges,
and am now absolutely certain of a deep and understanding friendship between our
two countries.’50 Not long after this meeting, on 31 October 1964, Franco Nogueira,
Portugal’s Foreign Minister, instructed the Consul-General at Salisbury to present a
message of support to the South Rhodesian government.51
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South Africa and Portugal: common interests, reciprocal fears
South African doubts regarding the Portuguese military and political administration
of their territories certainly shaped Pretoria’s initial response to the very violent
insurrection in northern Angola in March 1961. The immediate verdict of the South
African Consul-General at Luanda, C. B. H. Fincham, was that Angola would
become an independent country within one or two years.52 However, the Portuguese
proved more resolute than anyone expected. Salazar, having rid himself of General
Botelho Moniz, an US-leaning Minister of Defence who had tried to remove him
from power, took over that same portfolio and began to despatch troops to Africa in
ever-greater numbers.53 The secretary of the Department of External Affairs in
South Africa, G. P. Jooste, reported the Portuguese Ambassador in April 1961 tell-
ing him: ‘The battle for Africa had begun.’ The Portuguese diplomat bemoaned the
fact that Britain and the United States had badly let them down in Angola and they
could no longer trust their own blacks: ‘The Portuguese in Angola were experiencing
a complete disillusionment in this connection. “You (South Africa) were right and
we were wrong,” he added.’54
Despite the tide of violent and non-violent African nationalist pressure washing
over the ‘white redoubt’, and increasing economic contacts between South Africa
and the Portuguese colonies, a military understanding between South Africans and
Portuguese was not easy to achieve. Portugal had long feared the expansionist ten-
dencies of South Africa towards Mozambique, most notably given public expression
at the 1919 Paris Peace conference. The outbreak of violence in Angola, and the
resulting settler unrest there, gave new life to these fears.55 Portugal was also anxious
to continue to play up the positive aspect of the racial dispensation in its overseas ter-
ritories: an alliance with South Africa was incompatible with this, since apartheid
and Portugal’s ‘multi-racialism’ were, in theory, poles apart. Nevertheless, once
Portugal had made the decision to fight in Africa, closer ties with Pretoria became
inevitable. Portugal was not allowed to use NATO-supplied weaponry in its colonies;
South Africa was an obvious alternative supplier. Verwoerd was not unsympathetic
to Portuguese weapons requests, as he explained in a letter to Salazar in 1963, given
the dangers which threatened ‘Western civilization in Africa’.56 When he met H. T.
Taswell in August 1964, Salazar pointed out that if a generalised war broke out in
southern Africa, it would be in Pretoria’s interest to fight it 2,000 kms beyond its
boundaries. Consequently, by necessity it must be interested in the continuance of
stability in the wider region.57
Pretoria was certainly preparing for conflict: the South African defence budget
went from $100 million in 1961/62 to $358 million in 1966/67 and one year’s military
service was introduced for all able-bodied young white men in 1966.58 It made little
sense to invest so much in defence to then watch potential allies fall by the wayside.
Sometime prior to Taswell’s August 1964 meeting with Salazar, the South African
military gave consideration to a mutual defence pact with Portugal in the aftermath
of the break-up of the Federation. An SADF memorandum59, which was read by
General Grobbelaar, the Commandant General of SADF, advocated an alliance
with Portugal. Starting from the assumption that the final goal of black African
nationalism, supported by Communism, was the destruction of South Africa, it con-
cluded that the Portuguese territories gave important depth to the defence of South
Africa. It was, in other words, a precursor of the ‘Total Onslaught’ geopolitical the-
ory that came to dominate South African strategic thinking from 1970 to 1994. The
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break-up of the Federation had aided South Africa’s enemies and, consequently, it
was of vital importance that the remaining white-held areas to the North remained
in friendly hands, although the constitutional position of Southern Rhodesia pre-
cluded its inclusion in any alliance. It was also assumed that Portugal, while capable
of suppressing domestic guerrilla operations in its territories, would not be able to
resist an external attack; preventing this should be the aim of a mutual defence pact.
The paper considered that it would be necessary to establish common structures to
cover all facets of combined military operations by Portugal and South Africa as
such action required joint planning in normal times.60
The memorandum acknowledged that South Africa would have to provide weap-
ons and support for Portugal, despite the latter country’s policy of racial integration,
which Pretoria could not support. The advantages outweighed this and other draw-
backs: Southern Rhodesia would be encouraged to maintain white rule, while the pro-
tection of Mozambique would reassure the Rhodesians that their communications,
particularly their exports and oil supplies, could be maintained. Lastly, it was consid-
ered that openness or secrecy was a finally balanced issue: a secret treaty would pro-
voke less international criticism but a public pact would serve as a deterrent to military
adventures against the Portuguese territories. The document concluded that it was
imperative for South Africa’s security that the two Portuguese territories remain in
friendly hands and that Pretoria must be prepared to contribute actively to their
defence. To this end a military treaty with Portugal was regarded as an essential step.61
Among South African diplomats, the Consul-General at Luanda, Emmet
Malone, was the most persistent advocate of providing increased military and finan-
cial aid to Portugal. In April 1965 he warned of the urgency of the situation in
Angola and the ominous consequences for South Africa. Malone pointed out that
Portugal had 53,000 troops deployed in Angola, another 25,000 in Mozambique and
some 7,000 in Guinea, and was spending 40% of its total budget on military expendi-
ture, along with another 15% on basic strategic-development aid such as communica-
tions, at a time when the insurrections were at a relatively low ebb. How, then,
would Portugal cope with a simultaneous escalation in Angola and Mozambique?62
Malone’s anxieties about the Portuguese position, conveyed to the military authori-
ties, appear to have contributed to the MID producing a report on the subject. How-
ever, some nineteen months later, Malone was still writing on the subject, since little
had apparently been done. Noting that the Ambassador at Lisbon supported the
idea of assistance to Portugal, he urged that the MID report be dusted down as it
‘contained some very well thought out proposals as to how, precisely, we could best
help Portugal’.63 His conviction was ‘that it is vital to our long-term survival that
Angola and Mozambique must be held. I am equally convinced that, unless we
afford massive financial and (possibly) material assistance the Portuguese will be
unable indefinitely to bear the strain.’ Malone warned that it is ‘later than we think.
But not yet too late.’64
If Malone was enthusiastic about increased co-operation, Verwoerd and his
Foreign Minister, Dr Hilgard Muller, remained sceptics. When the Portuguese sent
an alarmist message in May 1966 claiming that the British planned an attack on
Beira to block Rhodesian oil supplies, and intimated that they wanted enhanced
defence co-operation, Muller was emphatic that South Africa should not enter into
any alliance with Portugal or Rhodesia. Salazar’s proposal, it was assessed, should
be diplomatically rebuffed in such a way as not to damage Portuguese morale, leav-
ing the door open for talks. Verwoerd’s reply accordingly played down the likelihood
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of a British strike attack and rejected the co-ordination of military forces with South
Africa and Rhodesia. Verwoerd thought that any military co-ordination would only
endanger South Africa’s interests.65 Within months, however, he was dead, the vic-
tim of an insane assassin. His successor, John Vorster, would not enjoy the same
prestige or dominance over his colleagues that Verwoerd had done and the road to
greater co-operation opened.
The transformation of South Africa’s attitude, 1966–70
It is clear from Portuguese records, and the account given by Correia and Verhoef,
that the change in the leadership in South Africa in 1966 made a considerable
difference to the situation. When P. W. Botha, the new Minister of Defence, visited
Portugal in April 1967, he argued that that there should be senior military liaison to
address common security problems. He also displayed a new generosity when it
came to military supplies, making it clear that South Africa would charge only
‘nominal prices’ for weapons, including aircraft. Over the next 18 months, Botha
agreed to provide five Alouette III helicopters and the thirty-three Panhard arm-
oured vehicles. Meeting Franco Nogueira, Botha stated that ‘South Africa would
only with the greatest difficulty survive a Portuguese collapse in those provinces,’ as
a result of which it was ‘ready to intervene militarily, with its own forces, to restore
the situation, should this become grave and should we [Portugal] request it’.66 A for-
mal alliance was ruled out; as Botha put it: ‘We were too good friends to need it.’
Later, in May 1968, Botha agreed to provide the spare parts for this equipment on a
free-loan basis.67
Malone’s replacement as Luanda Consul-General, A. F. Drake, took the view that
South African aid should be decisive in nature, but wondered whether success was pos-
sible.68 Matters, however, were coming to a head, thanks to the army, which was taking
centre stage in the process. Senior South African General Alan ‘Pop’ Fraser began reg-
ular visits to Angola, where he liaised with Portuguese officers engaged in the fight
against the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA guerrilla forces attacking the territory from
the North and East. Fraser was an enthusiastic student of French military strategist
Andre Beaufre, and became a leading exponent of the embedding of counter-
insurgency (COIN) doctrine in the South African Defence Forces. A Second World
War veteran, he had risen to the position of General Officer Command Joint Combat
Force by the late 1960s. He can be regarded as the father of the ‘Total Strategy’ which
became official South African defence policy from 1973.69 Fraser’s visit to Angola coin-
cided with increased Portuguese requests for weaponry from South Africa, addressed
to Fraser himself, to Botha, and to Muller.70 Botha, soon after his appointment as
Minister of Defence in 1966, became a convert to strategy and Fraser’s thinking. The
total onslaught faced by South Africa was being waged, Botha came to believe, in the
psychological, political, economic, and social spheres as well as on the military front.
Most importantly, it was driven by Soviet and Chinese machinations and had little to
do with indigenous African nationalism. As disciples of Beaufre, Fraser and Botha
advocated the extension of military security considerations into all areas of national
policy-making.71 This would not reach full fruition until Botha formed his own govern-
ment in 1978, but by then Botha and the military had entered into what Grundy
describes as a ‘classic patron-client relationship’.72
From the early 1960s, as South Africa’s military ties with the West declined, there
developed a relationship between the civilian and military spheres not unlike the
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kommando format of the Boer States at the end of the nineteenth century. South
Africa was developing ‘a strong coincidence in the personnel occupying elite civil
and military positions’.73 Botha’s power base in Defence ‘created the platform from
which he could grasp the leadership’.74 The institutionalisation of a ‘garrison state’,
the virtual displacement of the South African Cabinet by the State Security Council,
and the increasing dominance of the SADF in policy-making after 1978 all stemmed
from Botha’s rise.75 Botha was a bureaucratic empire-builder who benefited from
changes in the governmental structure brought about by John Vorster, who encour-
aged competition among ministers in the related areas of foreign, security, and
defence policy. For instance, the establishment in 1969 of BOSS, under the control
of Botha’s key rival for influence, General van den Bergh, resulted in a marked
improvement in intelligence liaison between Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa.
Botha, who came to despise van den Bergh and his influence over Vorster, may well
have seen the growing military partnership with Portugal as a means for enhancing
his own position. Other government departments were simply left out of the loop as
is evident from the notes on a conversation between Foreign Minister Muller and his
Portuguese counterpart, Rui Patrıcio, which make only the briefest allusion to staff
talks, suggesting that they were not being kept entirely in the picture.76
As early as April 1967 Botha, judging by his visit to Lisbon, had become an advo-
cate of much greater defence co-ordination between Pretoria and Lisbon - a consider-
able departure from the views of Verwoerd and Muller. From mid-1968, the South
Africans began to explore the issue of financial aid in greater detail. But here too
there were problems to be overcome. Many in Pretoria were concerned that Portugal
might not be able to repay a loan and South Africa did not want to give a grant.
Doubts were eased by the beginning of the flow of oil from the Cabinda fields: a loan
became a means of seeing Portugal through a difficult period until oil revenues com-
menced.77 Defence Minister Sa Viana Rebelo led a Portuguese delegation which met
Botha and senior SADF officer in Cape Town in February 1969. Botha proposed the
establishment of a permanent liaison between the two militaries, adding that the
Rhodesians were also interested. The Portuguese were open to the idea but reluctant
to openly acknowledge Rhodesian participation as it might damage their alliance
with Britain, the inference being that secret Rhodesian participation was accept-
able.78 The South African loan terms were considered ungenerous in Portuguese mili-
tary circles.79 Moreover, the price of the loan was not simply repayment. There was
to be much greater military co-operation and greater South African oversight of
Portugal’s colonial wars. To this end, explicit military conditions to be attached to
the loan were drafted in the Department of Defence, which noted that previous aid
had ‘not been large enough to be regarded as our having a stake in their military
operations’. However, further aid would allow the SADF to ‘feel more justified in
offering military advice and insisting upon particular actions, as it is often advisable
for us to have a say in Portuguese operations’.80 This financial aid, and the additional
leverage it gave South Africa, would be a key catalyst in the development of
ALCORA.
The Rhodesian problem
Rhodesia, on the other hand, despite being the strongest advocate of a defence pact,
had been left temporarily on the sidelines. Ian Smith, both before and after UDI,
had advocated just such an initiative, but to no avail.81 One barrier to deepening
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military links was the great fear of the internationalisation of the conflict in southern
Africa, which might provoke the military intervention of the United States, as
Vorster explained to the Rhodesians in October 196682 and again in March 1967,
when he and Smith met in Cape Town.83 This meeting followed on from the failed
attempt of Smith and Harold Wilson to agree a settlement during talks on HMS
Tiger in November 1966. Vorster endorsed Smith’s rejection of Wilson’s proposals.
Smith stressed ‘how meticulous’ he had been all along ‘to avoid unnecessarily impli-
cating and embarrassing our two great friends, South Africa and Portugal’. In his
account of the encounter, Smith wrote that Vorster ‘promised that South Africa
would try to stand by us come what may, but what was important was that they
should not be seen to be doing this’. He emphasised the importance of aid being
‘under the counter’ or ‘otherwise there was a danger of dragging South Africa into a
full sanctions war, even then we could find ourselves in a position where even if they
wished to help they would have no help to give’.
Smith then made two counter-proposals. The first was closer economic and
trade relations, with the ultimate aim of establishing a common market in Southern
Africa, including not only Rhodesia and South Africa but also Mozambique,
Angola, Malawi, Zambia (‘if sanity returned there’), and the Congo (‘if Tshombe
returned there’). The second was a defence pact between both countries and
Portugal. Smith hastened to add his realisation ‘that the present time was inoppor-
tune for anything to be said or done in public, but that there would be no harm in
starting to think’. Vorster appeared uninterested and Smith did not press the matter
further.84
South Africa’s continued reluctance to commit to a defence pact with Rhodesia is
evident from a 1969 Rhodesian file.85 On 21 October 1968, the Rhodesian Minister
of Defence wrote to the South African Foreign Minister recommending that prelimi-
nary discussions be held in respect of covert contingency planning for the defence of
Southern Africa which took place in December in Pretoria. On 3 January 1969 Ian
Smith wrote to Vorster, ‘saying that he felt very strongly that the question of contin-
gency planning should be expedited and that South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia,
should meet to discuss common threats and problems in the field of defence’. Smith
suggested an early meeting between respective ministers and service chiefs. Brand
Fourie, the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs, advised John Gaunt,
Rhodesia’s ‘accredited diplomatic representative’ in Pretoria, on 5 February 1969 to
the effect that these matters could be discussed at leisure by the ministers concerned.
The Rhodesians, however, pressed for a fixed-term military alliance. South Africa
remained reluctant, and, on 3 March 1969, General Fraser handed the Rhodesian
Chief of Staff, General Coster, a blunt letter which stated that South Africa
was involved in forging a maritime alliance involving a number of countries in the
Southern hemisphere, to be backed by the NATO powers. As a result: ‘South Africa
considers it unwise that there should be any closer formal links than already exist
between Portugal in Africa, Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa for the time
being.’ The Rhodesian view was that experience ‘has shown this to be inadequate
unless suitable terms of reference have been agreed at political level. This is what
the South Africans appear to want to avoid.’86 An attached paper noted that ‘in her
efforts to woo the west, South Africa would wish to avoid any implication of being
involved in a black/white struggle in Africa. She will foster the impression that her
concern is global rather than local, even though the latter threat is more pressing and
more real.’87
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Pretoria did not hold all the cards. Portuguese and Rhodesian officers and
defence officials had been moving closer since 1961. That year, the Federation’s
Defence Minister travelled to Angola, where it was determined that the civilian and
military authorities of both jurisdictions would meet regularly. Similar contacts
quickly developed with Mozambican authorities as well. Contacts intensified as a
result, in 1962, of rumours of the existence of a Mystere Plan, which outlined a forth-
coming conventional invasion of Portuguese territory by a Pan-African force. The
following year, a seven-officer liaison team from Rhodesia toured Angola, producing
an extensive report which was passed on to the Portuguese Consul in Salisbury,
despite the fact that it was critical of some aspects of the Portuguese handling of the
campaign, notably the lack of training in Africa and the inadequate length of Portu-
guese patrols (which lasted one or two days rather than the many weeks needed to
discover and destroy the enemy’s bases).88 On 23 September 1968 Portuguese and
Rhodesian officials met to discuss the threat posed by the possible construction of
the TANZAM railway by China.89 They concluded that contingency planning to
deal with the threat posed by thousands of Chinese workers needed to be considered.
At the meeting it was agreed to make separate representations to Pretoria about this
with a view to tripartite discussions taking place. However, the South Africans again
appeared to show some reluctance.90
The beginning of ALCORA
General Fraser, who had brusquely rejected the Rhodesian request for an alliance in
early 1969, appeared to change his mind soon after that. As was mentioned above,
Fraser was a regular visitor to Angola, studying Portuguese methods in their war
against the nationalist groups and finding them wanting. In May 1969, Ambassador
Menezes Rosa called on general Rudolph Hiemstra, the SADF’s Chief of Staff, who
was in possession of a report by Fraser after one such visit. Hiemstra was concerned
that the critical tone of the report might offend the Portuguese and this ‘was a very
delicate question, since they in no way wanted to be seen as wanting to have any
kind of interference in our problems and our conducting of operations’.91 Fraser, in
an October 1969 meeting with Menezes Rosa, emphasised his concerns about East
and Southeast Angola, especially the lack of co-ordination between Portuguese mili-
tary, intelligence, and administrative authorities. The frontline had moved 100 miles
westwards in a year, while brutal Portuguese reprisals were alienating Angolan
civilians.92
Fraser’s preliminary findings eventually found their way into a Top Secret
paper, A Review of the Campaign in East And South East Angola 1968 to End of
January 1970, issued in March 1970.93 This document was notable for its criticism of
Portuguese military tactics and civil administration in Angola and for its advocacy
of a COIN Strategy along the lines suggested in an earlier restricted pamphlet.94
What was most striking about the review was its lurid detailing of external threats to
the white states of southern Africa. It spoke of thrusts by an alliance of guerrilla
groups into Rhodesia and towards the oilfields of Angola, and most improbably of
all a Chinese-led invasion of white-rule southern Africa, for which the building on
the TANZAM railway was a prelude. The document, which ran to thirty-six pages,
was gloomy in its prognosis of the situation in Angola and the threats confronting
the ‘white redoubt’. It warned that South Africa and its friendly neighbours ‘will
ignore at our peril the increasing co-operation between the stronger liberation
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movements, which together with evidence of co-ordination of action between these
insurgent organisations under the auspices of the Russian-inspired Mobilisation
Committee of the OAU, spells a heightening of danger for the RSA and her friends
in Southern Africa’. The evident tendency to greater unity between the various guer-
rilla organisations placed ‘the terrorist war in a completely different light and it must
be emphasised that as this unity improves so will the dangers increase for Southern
Africa as a whole’.95
In a final section, the document switched from an analysis of the threat to a
detailed prescription for co-ordinated [white] southern African defence planning:
We have suggested what we believe this to be at the moment. We know from our recent
discussions with the Rhodesians that they agree with us in principle and we feel sure
that you, too, will subscribe to this view. You may now, and we all in the future may,
have other information to add to what we have said. There should obviously, therefore,
be a continuing joint study of the threat with particular reference now to the present
deteriorating situation in Rhodesia, Angola and Mocambique (Tete) [sic]. From this
study must come a joint assessment of its effect upon our three countries. Upon this
should follow joint defence planning. 96
Consequently, there was a requirement for South Africa to help Portugal and Rhodesia
as it would be ‘increasingly be looked to to provide at least the heavier and major por-
tion of a balanced force for Southern African Defence’. The section on contingency
planning provided the blueprint for ALCORA’s eventual structure.
Some in Portugal remained suspicious of South Africa’s intentions, but even they
understood that co-operation had become inevitable. An unsigned briefing document
prepared in advance of an unofficial visit to Lisbon by Vorster in June 1970 noted the
‘growing worry in the RSA over the evolution of subversion in Angola and
Mozambique’, as well as Pretoria’s lack of trust in Lisbon’s ability to control the situ-
ation. Moreover, South Africa seemed to be pursuing a policy of hegemony over the
region (developing better links with ‘moderate’ African states such as Malawi,
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Madagascar), as well as increasing its presence
in the economies of Angola, and Mozambique and reducing its dependence on
Portuguese infrastructure, notably Mozambican railways and ports. The Portuguese
line in the forthcoming talks should be to highlight the global character of subversion
in Southern Africa and the danger to the RSA of a Portuguese defeat; to make it
clear that the security situation would worsen in case of Rhodesian-style white gov-
ernments in Angola and Mozambique (which the RSA would have to fund on its
own); to improve the pooling of intelligence; and to emphasise the problems raised
by the direct intervention of RSA in Angola and Mozambique, insisting nevertheless
on greater support in military and infrastructural terms. Finally, there should be a
common diplomatic approach to the wider region, especially when it came to dealing
with ‘extremist’ African states such as Zambia, which the Portuguese blamed for the
deteriorating situation in Angola but with which Pretoria seemed reluctant to
clash.97
Exercise ALCORA was inaugurated at a two-way (South African and Portuguese)
conference in Pretoria in October 1970, a few short months after Fraser’s Review was
issued. In his report on proceedings, Colonel Francisco Maria Rocha Sim~oes noted
the pace which his South African counterparts sought to impose on the proceedings,
despite the fact that it was Portugal and Rhodesia who were facing the most immediate
danger. He also stressed that:
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During all of the meetings no unpleasant phrase or commentary was made regarding
Portugal, nor was there any criticism of the way it conducts its overseas operations, as
might be expected from the contents of the DEFENCE PLAN FOR SOUTHERN
AFRICA, issued in March 1970.98
Fraser, whose robust views on Portuguese tactics had caused considerable annoy-
ance in some Portuguese circles, was nowhere in sight. During the meeting ALCORA
was suggested as the codeword for the exercise (no explanation being provided for its
meaning), and it was stressed that Rhodesian agreement was needed before moving
forward. A joint document, signed by Rocha Sim~oes and Brigadier H.J. Greyvenstein,
South African Director of Strategic Planning, outlined the areas in which ALCORA
would operate, and charted the way forward: once the paper had been approved by
the ‘appropriate authorities of the three countries concerned’, a meeting should be
held, preferably, once more, in South Africa.99
The second meeting, held in Pretoria in March-April 1971, saw a senior
delegation of Rhodesian officers attending. The South African delegation, led by
Lieutenant General W. R. Van Der Riet (Chief of Defence Staff), now included
Fraser; the Portuguese were led by General Jo~ao Paiva Brand~ao, Vice-Chief of Staff
of the Combined Armed Forces (in charge of operations); and the Rhodesians by
Air Marshal A. O. G. Wilson, Chief of Air Staff. In his opening address, Van Der
Riet called it ‘an extremely historic conference’; this was the first time that the three
countries were meeting to ‘discuss their problems and decide how better to support
each other in the future’. For his part, Fraser urged his colleagues not to be deterred,
in the search for a ‘unified southern-Africa strategy’, by ALCORA’s foundation doc-
ument, approved in October 1970, which stated that recommendations made at
ALCORA meetings should not clash with the established national policies and strat-
egies; his point of view was unanimously accepted. From the minutes, Fraser emerges
as one of the engines of the meeting, proposing regular encounters, within the
ALCORA framework, between commanders-in-chief and between the ‘directors of
strategic planning’, or similar officers. These proposed meetings were not, however,
to the liking of the more cautious Portuguese.
At this meeting, the original structures devised in the 1970 meeting were tweaked;
there now emerged a Top-Level ALCORA Committee, an ALCORA Coordination
Committee, and ALCORA Subcommittees. A lot of the discussion was taken up
with the terms of reference for the Subcommittees, although the Portuguese were
informed that delegations from the other two countries had held bilateral discussions
on this issue in advance, producing a project that involved twelve of these bodies. All
agreed that work on the Intelligence Subcommittee would be prioritised, and that
this Subcommittee would be given access to the work of all the others. In a second
tier, in terms of priority, came those Subcommittees involved in the acquisition of
equipment with which to wage war: the Subcommittees on Air Planning; Air
Defence; Air Bases; Logistics; Telecommunications and Electronic Warfare; and
Communications. Last came those involved in Strategy and Operations: the Subcom-
mittees on a Common Counter-Insurgency Strategy; Objectives; Command and
Control; Psychological Action; and, finally, Cartography. Dates for the forthcoming
meetings of all of these bodies were also arrived at. Generally speaking, they would
meet twice a year until 1974, when their respective remits were transferred to PAPO.
Fraser’s Review, despite ruffling Portuguese feathers, clearly led to and set the
terms of ALCORA. It also was influential in ratcheting up the rhetoric of South
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African politicians, especially P. W. Botha. The exaggerated threat of a specific
enemy, China (in contrast with the more imprecise threat of ‘Communism’, which
had always been a major trope in South African Nationalist party rhetoric since the
1930s), began to appear in his speeches, echoing Fraser’s words. In 1971, Botha
spoke of ominous developments in the shape of Communist-bloc aircraft being
deployed in some of the frontline states. Two years later, at the height of Exercise
ALCORA, he spoke of the ‘total onslaughts on the Free World, which mean total
war in every sphere’.100 This was rhetoric that would feature in much of the material
generated by ALCORA. Defence-policy statements, most notably the 1973 White
Paper and its 1977 iteration, used much the same apocalyptic rhetoric.
Although it falls outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that
ALCORA’s limitations were clear from the start. At the end of 1971, the Odell
committee, limited to South African and Rhodesian defence officials, was estab-
lished to review the detoriating situation in the Tete region of Mozambique, close
to the strategically important site of the Cahora Bassa Dam and the border with
Rhodesia.101 Its tone and language reflected their disquiet about Portuguese tactics,
the threat from the guerrila movements, and the growing threat of Communist
China. According to the report, the committee members wanted to bring to the
notice of their governments, as a matter of urgency, the imminent danger to the
security of southern Africa: ‘The Tete district of Mozambique is rapidly emerging
as a crucial pivot in the struggle for southern Africa. If the enemy should succeed
in dominating the district of Tete, there will be an immediate and drastic change
for the worse in the precarious balance in the conflict presently training in the
whole of our strategic region. There are unmistakable signs that such an eventuality
is taking place.’ Tensions between Portugal and Rhodesia over Tete would mount
over the coming years, despite the existence of ALCORA. Moreover, a review of
ALCORA documentation suggests elements in Portugal’s military maintained a
less than wholehearted commitment to ALCORA, in comparison to their South
African and Rhodesian counterparts.102
Conclusion
ALCORA stemmed from growing apprehension about the situation in southern
Africa in the late 1960s, set against the background of a cold war in which the West
appeared to be hesitant, and the Communist bloc bullish. Whether or not it con-
stitued a formal military alliance is not clear; but the topics discussed in its many
committees, and its open-ended length, suggest that it was an alliance in the making,
whose development was interrupted by the Portuguese Revolution of April 1974. A
‘southern African Entente’ might perhaps be a more apt description. ALCORA’s
Top-Level Committee met eight times in four years, and the numerous subcommit-
tees met regularly, eventually being replaced by a permanent planning body. A per-
manent rapid-response force was also being assembled by 1974. ALCORA was not,
however, without problems. It did not, in the view of the South Africans and the
Rhodesians, have sufficient impact to rouse the Portuguese from their apparent tor-
por; it may well have been the case that it was too fixated on the ultimate threat of an
all-out assault on the ‘white redoubt’, and was not equipped to deal with trouble
spots such as Tete. Ultimately, ALCORA, kept secret, was no substitute for the
political solution to the wars in Africa which increasingly many officers and soldiers
in the Portuguese Army looked forward to, an aspiration that would lead to the 1974
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revolution. The ultimate failure of ALCORA might be, that for all the military liai-
son, their Rhodesian and South African colleagues failed to register this.103
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